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NOTE
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: CSLI, THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE,
AND PRIVACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
William Hopchak
ABSTRACT
Since Katz v. United States, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
revolved around privacy. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects more than just persons and property but also
information in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In United
States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established the
third-party doctrine, which holds that any voluntary communication of
information to a third party precludes a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that information, and thus, removes it from the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. This established paradigm was upset by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carpenter v. United States.
In Carpenter, the appellant challenged the admission of cell-site location
information (CSLI) obtained via a subpoena under the Stored
Communications Act, on the theory that it was an unconstitutional search
requiring a warrant. The Sixth Circuit applied the third-party doctrine to find
that since Carpenter voluntarily used his cell phone, effectively disclosing his
CSLI to his cellular providers, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy
therein. As such, no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
occurred, and the evidence was admissible. The Supreme Court reversed. It
refused to extend the third-party doctrine to these circumstances and instead
drew upon a line of cases suggesting there exists a privacy interest in the
totality of one’s physical movements.
The Supreme Court’s decision rightfully acknowledges the limitations of
existing privacy-focused jurisprudence to preserve the spirit if not the letter
of the Fourth Amendment in the digital age. The digital revolution has
created a unique set of circumstances in which information that in the
founding era would be kept in closely held papers is routinely stored on thirdparty servers. Also, the amount of data that can be passively and constantly
generated extends beyond what was conceivable in the not so distant past.
These circumstances deeply strain the third-party doctrine’s bright line
removing all voluntarily conveyed information from the Fourth
Amendment’s protection. Today, one could quickly face a decision between
participation in the modern social and economic world and maintaining any
privacy from government search. The Court in Carpenter took a small but

186

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

significant first step towards reshaping Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
account for new digital realities.
However, the Court also reached its result in a manner likely to create
complications in the future. Its reasoning was strained, and did not
adequately differentiate this instance from situations where the third-party
doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment protection. As a result, courts will
have to deal with a still generally applicable third-party doctrine but haunted
by the specter that at least sometimes privacy interests are too great to allow
the third-party doctrine to operate normally.
This note examines both the desirability of the Court’s result, as well as its
shortcomings. It then suggests possibly fruitful avenues forward as cases
inevitably arise, seeking to restrict the third-party doctrine further and
extend Fourth Amendment protections to other types of data. Interestingly,
returning to emphasizing property rather than privacy as a deciding factor in
Fourth Amendment cases offers significant advantages in simplifying Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, generating useful rules for this area of law in the
digital age, and accomplishing privacy centered goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies and changing circumstances always force the law to
develop in order to handle new situations. The digital revolution is in the
process of changing daily life in radical ways that courts and legislatures are
only beginning to address. Though a difficult and often sluggish process,
sometimes the adaptations necessitated by change create opportunities to
respond to new challenges while fixing old problems in the law. One such
instance is crafting a legal approach to dealing with the copious amounts of
data produced through normal daily activities. The Supreme Court ushered
in a new era with its decision in Carpenter v. United States. The majority
found a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site location information
(CSLI).1 This was a revolutionary decision for two reasons. First, it suggests
that in the future, similar privacy interests might be found in other forms of
data generated by an ever-increasing list of daily activities. Second, for the
first time, the Fourth Amendment protection was found to be completely
removed from property. The CSLI, in which the Court determined Carpenter
had a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment,
was the property of his cell phone provider. Even though the Court has long
held that the Fourth Amendment protects against more than the physical
intrusion of property, it has never before given persons a Fourth Amendment
interest in the property of another. Before examining in detail the Carpenter
1. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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decision and the opportunities it creates for the simultaneous development
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and crafting solutions to new big-data
related problems, it is necessary to survey the state of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Katz v. United States

For better or worse, privacy has been the nucleus of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence for the last fifty years. In Katz v. United States, Katz, the
defendant, appealed his conviction for communicating gambling
information.2 FBI agents placed a bug on the outside of the telephone booth
Katz used to convey the gambling information.3 Katz objected to the
admission of this evidence at his trial, and the circuit court affirmed the
conviction on the grounds that, because “there was no physical entrance into
the area occupied by the [the petitioner],” his Fourth Amendment rights had
not been violated.4 Though the Fourth Amendment historically concerned
the protection of property, the Supreme Court declared:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.5
This was the first step in the Court’s logic, moving Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence beyond a simple property focus. Next, the Court rejected the
government’s argument that since Katz was plainly viewable inside the glass
telephone booth, he was not protected by the Fourth Amendment.6 The
Court stated:
[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it,
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
3. Id. at 348.
4. Id. at 348–49 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134
(9th Cir. 1966)).
5. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 352.
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he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communication.7
These statements laid the foundation for the shift in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence the Court would accomplish with this case.
The Court went on to dispose of the government’s argument that no
infringement of Katz’s Fourth Amendment rights could have occurred since
there was “no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which [Katz]
placed his calls.”8 While acknowledging “the absence of such penetration was
at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, for that
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible
property,”9 the Court stated, “the premise that property interests control the
right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”10 The
court referenced Olmstead v. United States, where the Court decided
“whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the
defendants and others, intercepted by means of wiretapping, amounted to a
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”11 The Court used property
issues to dispose of the case, deciding that since there was no physical
intrusion on the property of the defendant, no search had occurred, even
though Olmstead’s phone conversations had been surveilled.12 The Court’s
rejection of property in Katz as the basis of Fourth Amendment analysis
radically altered the focus of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Though a rule might be inferred out of the majority decision, the Court
did not actually articulate precisely upon what analysis it was deciding; it said
simply that the Fourth Amendment protected persons, not places, and that
Katz had expected privacy while in the phone booth.13 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan attempted to offer a rule for explanation and future
application of the Court’s decision. He wrote, “there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”14 Applied to Katz, Justice Harlan
7. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 352–53.
10. Id. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
11. Olmstead v. United States., 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
12. Id. at 464–65.
13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52.
14. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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repeated the majority’s opinion that a telephone booth user (subjectively)
expects his conversation to be private, and he further opined that such
expectation was in fact objectively reasonable.15 This “reasonable expectation
of privacy” test would become a dominant feature of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence moving forward.
B.

Terry v. Ohio

One year after Katz, in Terry v. Ohio, the Full Court adopted Justice
Harlan’s two-pronged test.16 In that case, Terry had been arrested after a
plainclothes detective observed Terry and two others suspiciously
investigating a store front.17 After arresting them, the detective patted them
down and found a revolver in Terry’s coat pocket, which was later admitted
into evidence.18 Terry claimed the revolver was inadmissible because the
detective had violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he searched his
person.19 The Court saw the central question as being “whether . . . it was
reasonable for [the detective] to have interfered with [Terry’s] personal
security as he did.”20 The Court concluded that such a search was
reasonable.21 The reasonable expectation of privacy test became so ingrained
that the Court has even described Katz as the “[L]odestar” of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.22
Interestingly, the Court did not at all evaluate the first prong of Justice
Harlan’s test regarding whether Terry had a subjective expectation of privacy.
Perhaps the Court just assumed that there is a universal subjective
expectation of privacy as to the contents of one’s own pockets. However, the
Court has failed to address the first prong so consistently that it has been
argued that the subjective expectation of privacy prong of the test has been
effectively abandoned.23
C.

Third-Party Doctrine

A key development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after the
reasonable expectation of privacy test emerged was the third-party doctrine.
15. Id.
16. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
17. Id. at 5–7.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 7–8.
20. Id. at 19.
21. Id. at 30–31.
22. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
23. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015).
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This doctrine was developed in the cases of United States v. Miller and Smith
v. Maryland.24 Put succinctly, the third-party doctrine holds that a person has
no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in information voluntarily disclosed
to a third party.25
1.

United States v. Miller

In United States v. Miller, the defendant had been convicted of several
charges related to producing whiskey in an unregistered still.26 Miller had
moved for the suppression of his bank records, which detectives obtained
with a subpoena duces tecum.27 The district court denied the motion, but on
appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, deciding, “a depositor’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated when bank records . . . are obtained by means
of a defective subpoena.”28 The Supreme Court, in contrast, found “that
[Miller] had no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed
documents.”29
Miller argued that, “he ha[d] a Fourth Amendment interest in the records
kept by the banks because they [were] merely copies of personal records that
were made available to the banks for a limited purpose and in which he ha[d]
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”30 He argued that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test protected his banking records from search without
a warrant.31 The Court rejected this argument by also referencing Katz,
calling attention to the statement “that [w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”32 The Court
decided that all records and information Miller revealed to the bank were not
protected by a legitimate expectation of privacy, and therefore no Fourth
Amendment right was implicated by the government’s obtaining the
documents via a subpoena.33

24. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436
(1976).
25. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442–43 (1976).
26. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
27. Id. at 436.
28. Id. at 437.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 442.
31. Id.
32. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
33. Id. at 442–43.
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Smith v. Maryland

Three years later in 1979, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Maryland.
This case arose from the use of a pen register in a criminal investigation.34 In
response to a request from police investigators, Smith’s phone company
installed on their property a pen register device that recorded the phone
numbers dialed by Smith.35 Smith was convicted by the trial court, and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed.36 The Supreme Court took up the
case and addressed whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in
numbers dialed on the phone.37 Though they maintained that there is an
expectation of privacy in the contents of a private phone call, the number
dialed was information freely given to the phone company and was not
protected by any reasonable expectation of privacy.38
These two cases highlight that information freely divulged to a third party
is not covered by a reasonable expectation of privacy and is therefore not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. This doctrine was relied upon by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in deciding Carpenter.39 It has immense
implications in the post-digital revolution setting.
Residual Property Foundations

D.

Despite the dominance of privacy concerns in twentieth century Fourth
Amendment cases, the older property model did not become irrelevant. This
is best illustrated in Florida v. Jardines. This case concerned “whether using
a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of
the home is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”40 In
response to a tip, police took a trained drug dog onto Jardines’s porch; the
dog alerted for drugs and indicated the strongest source of the smell was the
front door.41 Subsequently, the police obtained a warrant, searched the home,
and found marijuana.42 Jardines was arrested and charged with drug
trafficking.43 Jardines moved for the discovered marijuana plants to be
excluded from evidence, claiming that the use of the drug-sniffing dog

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736–37 (1979).
Id. at 737.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 741–42.
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3 (2013).
Id. at 3–4.
Id.
Id.
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violated Fourth Amendment protections.44 The trial court agreed and
excluded evidence found while executing the warrant authorized in response
to the canine investigation.45 The Florida Third District Court of Appeal
reversed, but the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.46
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari, limited to the question whether the
officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”47
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began by calling attention to the
fact that, originally, Fourth Amendment protections were closely connected
to property and physical intrusion thereon by the government.48 Speaking of
Katz’s expansion of the Fourth Amendment’s scope, Justice Scalia wrote,
“though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the
Amendment’s protections ‘when the Government does engage in [a] physical
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.’”49 Such being the case, Justice
Scalia declared Jardines to be a simple case: the officers had entered the
curtilage of the home and investigated without Jardines’s consent.50 This type
of physical intrusion and search is precisely what the Fourth Amendment
forbade. Though there is a general, implied license to enter the curtilage of a
home to knock on the door, there is no parallel license to bring a trained,
drug-sniffing dog to the door to screen for drugs.51 Justice Scalia also made
clear that there was no need to engage in a reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis under Katz: “One virtue of the Fourth Amendments [sic] propertyrights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”52 Since a physical trespass had
occurred, the Court decided that Jardines’s Fourth Amendment rights had
been infringed and affirmed the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.53
E.

Data Problems

Such was the legal world in which Carpenter arose; however, the actual
world had changed significantly since the Katz, Smith, and Miller decisions.
The digital revolution has changed and continues to change the world,
44. Id. at 4–5.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).
50. Id. at 5–6.
51. Id. at 5–11.
52. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11.
53. Id. at 12.

2020]

CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES

193

straining a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that developed in the predigital world. The amount of digital data produced is staggering; in 2016
monthly global IP traffic was estimated to reach 91.3 exabytes.54 Smart
phones have become ubiquitous, and the internet of things is looming just on
the horizon and will soon be a normal and pervasive facet of life. The internet
of things is what the imminent connection and integration of myriad devices,
machines, and appliances into the internet is being called. Estimates are that
“nearly 26 billion devices [will be] connected to the Internet of Things by
2020.”55
A great deal of this information will have immense privacy implications.
Digital information regarding physical movements, associations, and
medical treatments are just a few obvious examples of data with great
potential to be highly sensitive. Empirical study indicates that most people
are at least somewhat aware of the privacy implications created by big data
and disapprove of the pervasiveness of data collection that is currently
commonplace on the internet.56 Even though current law requires disclosure
to and consent from users to collect data, most people appear to begrudgingly
accept the unwanted invasion of their privacy as the cost of functioning in
the digital age.57 Not only are most people unhappy with how much data the
private sector collects, they are “very skeptical of government data
collection.”58
1.

Data and Third-Party Doctrine

Sensitive information is vulnerable under the third-party doctrine because
it is stored by third parties. Private parties are not restricted by the Fourth
Amendment in regards to what data they may collect and record from users,
and once that data is given to the third party, or if the data is originally
produced by the third party, then the user has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in it per Smith and Miller. This reasoning was displayed in two
predecessor cases to Carpenter. In United States v. Davis and United States v.
Graham, the courts concluded that CSLI was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment because of the third-party doctrine since it was generated and

54. Phil Bradley, Data, Data Everywhere, 14 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 249, 249 (2014) (An
“exabyte could hold 100,000 times the printed material in the Library of Congress”).
55. Id. at 250.
56. Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, & Masooda N. Bashir, A Comprehensive Empirical Study
of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267, 271 (2016).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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maintained as a business record by the cell service providers, not the cell
user.59
That the third-party doctrine exposes so much information to
government surveillance without requiring demonstration of probable cause
and the issuing of a warrant is troubling to scholars and lay people alike. As
previously mentioned, the majority of Americans are uncomfortable with
governmental surveillance of big data.60 It is accepted that constitutionally
protected rights must cover modern analogs and developments of the right
as it existed during the founding era.61 The issue arises in that much of what
was previously kept in one’s own records or destroyed is now stored, or even
generated, on a third-party server. Strict application of the third-party
doctrine renders all such information outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, but the impact of the digital revolution on daily
life may be so significant that protecting what was within the original scope
of intent of the Fourth Amendment will require rethinking the protections,
or lack thereof, regarding information given to third parties.
In an article in Brooklyn Law Review, Amitai Etzioni explains that “[i]n
the paper age, the main issue was whether or not the government should be
allowed to collect personal information without first gaining a court’s
approval. . . . [But] [i]n the cyber age, secondary usages of legally-collected
information have become so common that a very major concern has become
the circumstances under which such usages should be banned to preserve
privacy.”62 He continues, “So much legally-collected personal information is
available in the hands (or in the cloud) of third parties that their secondary
usages determine to a large extent how much privacy we still have.”63
2.

Proposed Solutions

Etzioni believes that a new privacy paradigm is absolutely needed in this
digital age because the majority of privacy violations used to be committed
by the government directly through primary collection, but now “most
violations in the cyber age result from secondary usages of information that
has been legally collected.”64 Since the third-party doctrine allows

59. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
498 (11th Cir. 2015).
60. Kesan, supra note 56.
61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (citations omitted).
62. Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: More Coherent, Less Subjective, and
Operational, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (2015).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1264.
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government to look into any of this legally collected data, Etzioni concludes
that:
[I]f the third party doctrine is allowed to stand, precious
little personal information will remain protected from
government incursion. Furthermore, because third parties
can share information with others and combine it with still
more information, the government and corporations can
create detailed and intimate dossiers of innocent people
unsuspected of crimes. Individuals constantly leave behind
a trail of data with every click of a mouse, “data exhaust” akin
to the vapors left behind a car.65
Etzioni points out that he is not the first to criticize the third-party doctrine
in the cyber age.66 He then propounds a theoretical “Cyber Age Privacy
Doctrine” that would evaluate privacy concerns in terms of the volume,
sensitivity, and degree of cybernation of the collected material.67 His model
is highly theoretical and in stark contrast to certain well-established points of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Though, in fairness to his theory, to
depart from established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a great deal of
his point. However, the model is unlikely to prove workable or adoptable due
to its fundamental overhauling of and conflict with established law.
Other scholars have suggested solutions as well. In conjunction with their
empirical research on popular opinions regarding big data and government
surveillance thereof, Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, and Masooda N. Bashir
have proposed a clearinghouse model akin to credit score companies: “we
suggest the creation of a profile repository to provide a centralized location
for consumers to view the nonsensitive information that data brokers and the
government hold about them, while also giving consumers the option to

65. Id. at 1267.
66. Id. at 1267 n.24 (citing Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
“Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981); Susan W. Brenner &
Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional
Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y. 211, 215 (2006); Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships:
Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1093
(2006); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3 (2007); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND.
L.J. 549, 564–66 (1990); Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search
Records and the Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, UCLA J.L. & TECH.,
Spring 2007, at 1, 3; Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1983)).
67. Etzioni, supra note 62, at 1273.
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challenge or remove some elements of their profiles.”68 Though perhaps less
grandiose than Etzioni’s sweeping new paradigm of privacy law, this too
appears far from implementable.
Property law, however, has been explored as an avenue that might address
the problems created in applying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the
digital age. Jane Baron explores how the bundle-of-rights metaphor in
property law can promote clear thinking and aid in evaluating the competing
interests and needs in data.69 Specifically, Baron explored how different
“sticks” could easily be allocated to different parties in the context of
electronic health records and privately created consumer databases.70 If
patients and consumers are granted property interests in such data, which
currently hover “awkwardly” at the intersection of “existing legal categories
such as property, privacy, and intellectual property,”71 then they would have
a Fourth Amendment interest in it and the government would be required to
obtain a warrant before accessing the information, even though they would
be gaining access via a third party and not via the individual.
III. CARPENTER
A.

Facts

In Carpenter v. United States, the Court addressed “whether the
Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it
accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle
of the user’s past movements.”72 After a string of robberies in Michigan and
Ohio, police arrested four suspects.73 One of those men implicated the
petitioner, Thomas Carpenter.74 After getting his phone number from the
other suspects, prosecutors obtained Carpenter’s cell phone records via court
orders pursuant to the Stored Communications Act.75 Federal Magistrates
ordered Carpenter’s cell service providers “to disclose ‘cell/site sector
[information] for [Carpenter’s] telephone[] at call origination and at call
termination for incoming and outgoing calls’ during the four-month period
when the string of robberies occurred.”76 Such orders were sent to each of
68. Kesan, supra note 56, at 272.
69. Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L.
REV. 57 (2013).
70. Id. at 94–100.
71. Id. at 94.
72. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
73. Id. at 2212.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Carpenter’s providers.77 The first provider, in response to a demand for 152
days of records, provided records covering 127 days.78 The second provider,
in response to demands for seven days of records, produced two days’
worth.79 “Altogether the Government obtained 12,898 location points
cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”80
This data was used at trial to show Carpenter was in the area of four of the
robberies.81 Cell phones function by connecting to cell-sites in their
proximity.82 Cell-sites are radio antennas and are usually mounted on towers,
though they can also be mounted to myriad smaller objects such as light poles
and buildings.83 Cell-sites generally have multiple directional antennas each
covering a particular sector of the covered area.84 Whenever a cell phone
makes a call, it connects to a cell-site; smart phones also connect to the
network “several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner
is not using one of the phone’s features.”85 “Each time the phone connects to
a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location
information (CSLI).”86 The denser the concentration of cell-sites in an area,
the more precisely the CSLI can be used to locate the phone.87
The CSLI data obtained by prosecutors placed Carpenter in the same areas
as four of the robberies when they were committed.88 Carpenter moved for
the CSLI data to be excluded at trial, but the district court judge allowed it.89
In addition to the testimony of seven of his confederates alleging Carpenter
was the group’s leader, an FBI agent testified as a witness to explain the CSLI
data.90 The agent explained CSLI data and showed a map correlating the CSLI
data to the locations of the robberies.91 Carpenter was convicted of six counts
of robbery and five counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of
violence.92
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2211.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2111–12.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2212.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id.
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, specifically holding
that the CSLI data was admissible evidence and applying the third-party
doctrine.93 The Sixth Circuit held “Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had
shared that information with his wireless carriers.”94 Since “cell phone users
voluntarily convey cell-site data to their carriers as ‘a means of establishing
communication,’ the court concluded that the resulting business records are
not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”95
B.

Majority Opinion

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts took up the issue of
whether the third-party doctrine applied in this instance. Roberts understood
the case to “not fit neatly under existing precedents”; it was “at the
intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of
the privacy interests at stake.”96 The first line of cases dealt with “a person’s
expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements.”97 The second
line was the above examined reasonable expectation of privacy line of cases.98
In handling the first line, Chief Justice Roberts referenced United States v.
Knotts and United States v. Jones.99 In Knotts, investigators used a “beeper” to
aid in visually tracking a vehicle to a remote cabin. In that case, “[t]he Court
concluded that the ‘augment[ed]’ visual surveillance did not constitute a
search because ‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.’”100 In Jones, FBI agents used a GPS device to track
the petitioner’s every driven movement for 28 days.101 Even though the case
was decided on physical trespass grounds, Roberts emphasized that:
[F]ive Justices agreed that related privacy concerns would
be raised by, for example, “surreptitiously activating a stolen
vehicle detection system” in Jones’s car to track Jones
himself, or conducting GPS tracking of his cell phone. Since
GPS monitoring of a vehicle tracks “every movement” a
93. Id. at 2213.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979)).
96. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214–15.
97. Id. at 2215.
98. Id. at 2216.
99. Id. at 2215.
100. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
101. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).

2020]

CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES

199

person makes in that vehicle, the concurring Justices
concluded that “longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy”—regardless whether those movements were
disclosed to the public at large.102
The spirit of this dicta would figure heavily in the Court’s decision in
Carpenter.
The Court recognized the odd confluence of the two lines of jurisprudence
in this one factual situation. CSLI “tracking partakes of many of the qualities
of the GPS monitoring we considered in Jones.”103 Chief Justice Roberts
continued, “At the same time, the fact that the individual continuously
reveals his location to his wireless carrier implicates the third-party
principle.”104 The Court decided that the third-party doctrine did not extend
to Carpenter’s “novel circumstances.”105 The Court articulated a new rule:
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the
fact that the information is held by a third party does not by
itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. Whether the Government employs its own
surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the
technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record
of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.106
The Court thus held that the CSLI data at issue “was the product of a
search.”107
It mattered greatly to the Court that CSLI information was allowing for
unprecedented degrees of surveillance. It was more significant to the Court
that “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected,” than the fact that new technology
had created a situation in which one constantly and voluntarily
communicates to a third party his physical location.108 The situation would
be even worse than allowing GPS tracking of vehicles, the Court reasoned,
102. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 2216.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2217.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
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since cars are not the constant companion of their owners.109 The Court
referenced studies indicating that most “smart phone users report being
within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they
even use their phones in the shower.”110 The third-party exception had been
developed in a time when such ease of total surveillance of every physical
movement made was inconceivable, and the Court did not believe it so
valuable as to require asserting it against expectations of privacy in this new
context.
Another point of great concern to the Court was the “retrospective quality
of the data.”111 “In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements
were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection.”112
However, CSLI data is routinely stored by service providers for five years.113
Thus, any user of any one of the 400 million devices in the country would be
subject to government scrutiny of years of their movement.114 Whenever one
finds himself the subject of investigation, it will be as if “he has . . . been tailed
every moment of every day for five years.”115
While the Court was concerned about the retrospective qualities of CSLI
data, they were prospective in their ruling. In response to arguments that
CSLI data is not granular or specific enough to implicate serious privacy
concerns, the Court noted that “CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level
precision.”116 It is only a matter of time, and probably a short amount of time,
before improvements in cellular data and increased volume of cell-site
locations will allow CSLI data to precisely locate an individual.
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts briefly asserted that another reason the
third-party doctrine does not apply is because CSLI is not voluntarily
communicated to the provider.117 The third-party doctrine extends to
voluntarily revealed or communicated information.118 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote that “[CSLI] is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the

109. Id. at 2218.
110. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2218–19.
117. Id. at 2220. Judge Wynn raised this argument in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Graham. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 442–44 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wynn,
Floyd, & Thacker, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
118. Id. at 2219–20.
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term.”119 Chief Justice Roberts first asserted, “cell phones and the services
they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying
one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”120 Next, he noted
that CSLI data is created “without any affirmative act on the part of the user
beyond powering up.”121 Since just using the phone creates the CSLI, and
since using a phone is necessary to participation in modern life, the Court
concluded that “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[]
the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical
movements.”122
For these reasons, the Court concluded that “when the Government
accessed CSLI from the wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”123 It therefore
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case.124
Dissenting Opinions

C.

1.

Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy authored a dissent in which Justice Thomas and Justice
Alito joined.125 The thrust of Justice Kennedy’s argument was that the court
should have applied the third-party doctrine.126 Justice Kennedy phrased the
fundamental issue of the case as “whether the Government searched anything
of Carpenter’s when it used compulsory process to obtain cell-site records
from Carpenter’s cell phone service providers.”127 He answered this question
emphatically in the negative.128 He asserted that the third-party exception
makes clear that one does not have any Fourth Amendment interest in the
business records of another.129 He rejected criticism of Miller and Smith,
stating, “[t]he principle established in Miller and Smith is correct for two
reasons, the first relating to a defendant’s attenuated interest in property
owned by another, and the second relating to the safeguards inherent in the
use of compulsory process.”130 Even though it is now settled that the Fourth
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 2220.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2223.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–24 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2226.
Id.
Id. at 2226–27.
Id. at 2227.
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Amendment protects persons and their reasonable expectations of privacy,
not just property, Justice Kennedy asserted that “the Fourth Amendment’s
protections must remain tethered to the text of that Amendment, which,
again, protects only a person’s own ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”131
Essentially, no matter how great the perceived expectation of privacy one
may have in the records of another, since those records are not the property
of the interested party, the Government has not violated that party’s Fourth
Amendment rights when it accesses those records. To hold otherwise is to
abandon the clear language of the Constitution. Kennedy also asserted that
the subpoena procedure required by law is adequate protection.132
2.

Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas wrote a similar dissenting opinion.133 He began, “This case
should not turn on ‘whether’ a search occurred. It should turn, instead, on
whose property was searched.”134 It was, for Justice Thomas, a simple matter.
The Fourth Amendment protects “individuals[’] . . . right to be secure from
unreasonable searches of ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”135
Justice Thomas emphasized that the Fourth Amendment protections extend
to a parties’ own person, houses, papers, and effects, not to the person,
houses, papers, and effects of anyone else.136 Justice Thomas asserted, “[b]y
obtaining the cell-site records of [Carpenter’s wireless carriers], the
Government did not search Carpenter’s property.”137 Justice Thomas did not
simply claim that the majority made an error applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy test; he asserted, “The Katz test has no basis in the text
or history of the Fourth Amendment. And, it invites courts to make
judgments about policy, not law. Until we confront the problems with this
test, Katz will continue to distort Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”138 The
thrust of Justice Thomas’s argument was that privacy has usurped property
as the guiding paradigm for understanding the Fourth Amendment.139 He
asserted that “Justice Harlan’s focus on privacy in his concurrence—an
opinion that was issued between Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade—
reflects privacy’s status as the organizing constitutional idea of the 1960s and
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228–29.
Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236.
Id. at 2239–40 (citations omitted).
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1970s. The organizing constitutional idea of the founding era, by contrast,
was property.”140
3.

Justice Gorsuch

Justice Gorsuch’s dissent was unique in that it largely agreed with the
result reached by the majority, but it largely disagreed with the reasoning of
both the majority and the other dissenting opinions.141 He was extremely
open to finding a means of considering CSLI data to be within the protections
of the Fourth Amendment but did “not agree with the Court’s decision . . . to
keep Smith and Miller on life support and supplement them with a new and
multilayered inquiry that seems to be only Katz-squared.”142 He worried that
returning to the Katz standard “promise[d] more trouble than help.”143 He
wanted to explore “more traditional Fourth Amendment approach[es],” and
bemoaned the Court’s denial of the opportunity to do so by Carpenter’s
appealing only on the theory of a Katz’s reasonableness test and failing to
preserve other appeals.144
a.

Critique of third-party doctrine

Justice Gorsuch began by expressing his skepticism that the Smith and
Miller third-party doctrine is well suited to life in the internet age.145 Since the
third-party doctrine excludes from Fourth Amendment protection anything
disclosed to a third party and “we use the Internet to do most everything,” he
wondered “what’s left of the Fourth Amendment?”146 The average American
is constantly volunteering information about themselves, and “even our most
private documents—those that, in other eras, we would have locked safely in
a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside on third party servers.”147 To
mechanistically apply Smith and Miller would mean that “police can review
all of this material, on the theory that no one reasonably expects any of it will
be kept private.”148 Justice Gorsuch pointed out that “no one believes that, if
they ever did.”149 He saw three options for dealing with this situation: “The
first is to ignore the problem, maintain Smith and Miller, and live with the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 2240.
Id. at 2262–2272 (Gorsuch J. dissenting).
Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272.
Id. at 2262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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consequences.”150 Second, the Katz reasonableness standard could be applied
directly to the situation, and Smith and Miller could be set aside.151 Finally,
Justice Gorsuch said that an answer could be sought elsewhere outside of the
Katz paradigm entirely.152
(1)

Option 1: Continue with Smith and Miller

Justice Gorsuch rejected the first option of ignoring the problem and
continuing with Smith and Miller.153 In contrast to the Court’s opinion in
those cases, “[p]eople often do reasonably expect that information they
entrust to third parties, especially information subject to confidentiality
agreements, will be kept private.”154 He noted that the Supreme Court has
never justified the third-party doctrine and instead has simply declared that
one who reveals information to a third party “‘“assum[es] the risk”’ it will be
revealed to the police and therefore [there is no] reasonable expectation of
privacy.”155 Justice Gorsuch found no convincing justification for this
assertion by the Court.156
(2)

Option 2: Sola Katz

Turning to the second option, Justice Gorsuch concluded that even if
Smith and Miller were discarded and the Katz test alone were relied upon,
problems would remain.157 First, he agreed that Katz is a highly problematic
decision and expressed his agreement with the critique of Katz offered by
Justice Thomas in his dissent.158 He found it troubling to leave Fourth
Amendment protections dependent upon “the breach of some abstract
‘expectation of privacy’ whose contours are left to the judicial
imagination.”159 Justice Gorsuch asserted that “the Amendment grants you
the right to invoke its guarantees whenever one of your protected things
(your person, your house, your papers, or your effects) is unreasonably
searched or seized. Period.”160 Moving beyond originalist and historical
critiques of Katz, Justice Gorsuch argued that “[e]ven taken on its own terms
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2263.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Katz has never been sufficiently justified.”161 He continued, “we still don’t
even know what its ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test is.”162 He argued
that taken either as an empirical question or a normative question, legislators
should be defining the reasonable expectation of privacy, not “[p]olitically
insulated judges . . . armed with only the attorney’s briefs, a few law clerks,
and their own idiosyncratic experiences.”163
(3)

Option 3: Pre-Katz Property

Finally, Justice Gorsuch turned his attention to traditional, pre-Katz
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to see what answers it offered.164 He did
not state precisely what this approach has to offer, but he proposed a clear
path forward for future exploration.165 He called attention to the fact that
until the 1960s, “a Fourth Amendment claim didn’t depend on your ability
to appeal to a judge’s personal sensibilities about the ‘reasonableness’ of your
expectations of privacy.”166 Rather, “it was tied to the law.”167 “The traditional
approach asked if a house, a paper or effect was yours under law,” and “[n]o
more was needed to trigger the Fourth Amendment.”168 Citing Byrd and
Jardines, Justice Gorsuch clarified that this traditional approach has never
been discarded, but only overshadowed by Katz.169 Justice Gorsuch observed
that due to the dominance of Katz, “American courts are pretty rusty at
applying the traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment.” 170 While it is
still clear “that if a house, paper, or effect is yours, you have a Fourth
Amendment interest in its protection,” there are things we now do not
know.171 “[W]hat kind of legal interest is sufficient to make something yours?
And what source of law determines that? Current positive law? The common
law at 1791, extended by analogy to modern times? Both?”172 Justice Gorsuch
believed “[m]uch work is needed to revitalize this area and answer these

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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167.
168.
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171.
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Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2265.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 2267–68
Id. at 2267–71.
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Id. at 2267–68.
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questions.”173 He did not offer to answer those questions in this dissent, but
he did offer several points in light of them.174
First, Justice Gorsuch called attention to the potential usefulness of
bailment law in understanding and articulating a Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence for the digital age: “the fact that a third party has access to or
possession of your papers and effects does not necessarily eliminate your
interest in them,” and one does not lose Fourth Amendment protection over
bailed property.175 Justice Gorsuch noted that in some cases the law already
recognizes this fact.176 Mailed letters “are ‘as fully guarded from examination
and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.’”177 Justice
Gorsuch posited that “just because you entrust your data—in some cases,
your modern-day papers and effects—to a third party may not mean you lose
any Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.”178
Second, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that “complete ownership or
exclusive control” is not necessary to vest Fourth Amendment protections.179
For example, a house may be owned by multiple persons, but each person
enjoys Fourth Amendment protections in that home.180 Further, one who
simply resides in a home without any legal title to it still enjoys such Fourth
Amendment protections.181 Having established this premise, Justice Gorsuch
posited that “just because you have to entrust a third party with your data
doesn’t necessarily mean you should lose all Fourth Amendment protections
in it.”182 He referenced constructive bailments such as are created when one
finds lost property.183 Just as the first owner’s property rights, including
Fourth Amendment rights, are fully in force over this property that by
necessity has come into another’s possession, third parties coming into
possession of a user’s data may not extinguish the user’s interests.184 He
noted, “[a]t least some of this Court’s decisions have already suggested that
use of technology is functionally compelled by the demands of modern life,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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and in that way the fact that we store data with third parties may amount to
a sort of involuntary bailment too.”185
Next, Justice Gorsuch noted that “positive law may help provide detailed
guidance on evolving technologies without resort to judicial intuition.”186 He
wrote that statutes can create a property interest within the contemplation of
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and that such could be informative
for determining what property also enjoys Fourth Amendment
protections.187 Further, “[i]f state legislators or state courts say that a digital
record has the attributes that normally make something property, that may
supply a sounder basis for judicial decisionmaking than judicial guesswork
about societal expectations.”188
Finally, Justice Gorsuch made the point that “while positive law may help
establish a person’s Fourth Amendment interest there may be some
circumstances where positive law cannot be used to defeat it.”189 His point
was that Congress or a state legislature could not enact a law excluding from
the Fourth Amendment some sort of property that the Constitution
contemplates protecting.190 Closely related to this was his fifth point that “this
constitutional floor may, in some instances, bar efforts to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment’s protection through the use of subpoenas.”191 Here,
Justice Gorsuch noted the intersection of Fifth Amendment and Fourth
Amendment principles.192 He argued that as originally understood, the Fifth
Amendment protection from self-incrimination also protected against
forced production of incriminating documents.193 As such, a subpoena
should in some cases be viewed as a search or seizure forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment, and it should not be allowed to serve as a tool to sidestep Fourth
Amendment protections.194
Justice Gorsuch ended his dissent on an understated note. He did not seem
to take any real issue with the result of the Court’s decision; in fact, he spent
most of his dissent exploring ways to extend Fourth Amendment protection
to data like CSLI. He did fault the Court for deciding “to keep Smith and
Miller on life support and supplement them with a new and multilayered
185.
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inquiry.”195 He seemed to believe that, had Carpenter preserved and argued
objections grounded in property interests rather than privacy expectations,
the case could have been resolved in his favor. Since these points were not
argued, they could not be explored, but Justice Gorsuch clearly suggested a
willingness and desire to explore these issues in a subsequent case.196
III. ANALYSIS
Carpenter is a complicated case dealing with an area of law that was
already complicated when it was developed and was made more complicated
by the novel strains of the digital age. The situation brings to mind the famous
adage: “Hard cases make bad law.” The dissenters were right to attack it. The
majority’s reasoning is strained, but the result the dissents would have
preferred does not seem acceptable either. In this case, the majority was
clearly working to obtain a specific desirable result, while the dissenters were
nobly trying to adhere to sound legal reasoning and defer to precedent. This
situation is what makes Justice Gorsuch’s dissent so worthy of attention and
serious exploration by courts and scholars moving forward.
A.

Strained Reasoning in Majority Decision

The majority’s reasoning is strained. The single greatest example of this,
and the one most threatening to their position, is the degree to which they
played fast and loose with Knotts and Jones. The majority attempts to situate
the case at the confluence of third-party doctrine and a “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”197
However, its reliance upon Knotts and Jones is suspect. As Justice Kennedy
explained in his dissent, Knotts actually asserted that “[a] person traveling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”198 Justice Kennedy
further argued that the “different constitutional principles” which the Knotts
Court said “may be applicable” in different circumstances only applied when
a citizen was subjected to constant surveillance lacking any judicial
oversight.199 Since the CSLI collected in this case was the product of a
subpoena obtained from a federal magistrate in conformance with the Stored
Communications Act, Justice Kennedy believed “[t]hose ‘different
constitutional principles’ mentioned in Knotts, whatever they may be, do not
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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apply. . . .”200 Moving on to address the majority’s reliance on Jones, Justice
Kennedy highlighted the point that the case was decided on property grounds
and did not address reasonable expectations of privacy.201
B.

Dissent Deficiencies

However, as strong as this critique of the majority and the others
addressed above are, the fact remains that the dissenters failed to seriously
consider that what Knotts and Jones glimpsed may in fact have actually come
to pass. The dissenters, while relying upon tighter legal argument and
originalist principals, miss a great deal of the point. They would extend old
precedent such that the Fourth Amendment would become largely
meaningless. What guides the majority is a commitment to the spirit and
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. “The ‘basic purpose of this Amendment,’
our cases have recognized, ‘is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’”202 The
majority reads precedent to indicate that the Fourth Amendment “seeks to
secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power,’” and “that a central aim
of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.’”203 Commitment to these purposes drove the majority to reach
the decision it did.
The dissenters’ commitment to the strict property focus of the Fourth
Amendment itself is incorrect. Even if the Fourth Amendment is supposed
to exclusively protect property—especially the sanctum of the home—how
protected can that property be when constantly disclosed data is free for the
government’s taking? Cellphones are the constant companions of their
owners, used inside as well as outside the home. Further, as mentioned
before, it will soon be commonplace for many if not all appliances within the
home to constantly generate data which is immediately communicated to
third parties. Literally, the contents of one’s refrigerator would be open to
government inspection without any showing of probable cause or obtaining
of a warrant. Some strict constructionist originalists will accept this as
tolerable since it flows from a straightforward, narrow reading of the text.
However, this is in error. The Fourth Amendment protected property in
order to protect privacy. Now that technology has changed such that
protecting property alone cannot accomplish the same privacy focused goal,
accomplishing the spirit of the amendment requires expanding its protection
to new realms.
200.
201.
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203.
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These same originalists would acknowledge that rights must be
understood to adapt with technological development; indeed this is perfectly
asserted by Justice Scalia in District of Columbia v. Heller where he explains
that Second Amendment protections do not extend only to firearms as they
existed in the eighteenth century, but to their modern equivalents as well.
Justice Scalia wrote, “Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of
communications, . . . and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms
of search, . . . the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments
that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the
time of the founding.”204 Justice Scalia cited Kyllo v. United States in making
the above point, and the Court in Carpenter cited Kyllo as well.205 In Kyllo,
the Court “rejected . . . a ‘mechanical interpretation’ of the Fourth
Amendment and held that use of a thermal imager to detect heat radiating
from the side of the defendant’s home was a search. . . . [As] any other
conclusion would leave homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing
technology.’”206 Possessing the same genius which would animate the
Carpenter majority, the Kyllo Court crafted its ruling in order to “assure[]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”207
That the Fourth Amendment should be focused on protecting privacy,
and protects property as the means toward that end, is sensible within the
broader constitutional context. Given its broad recognition in the American
legal landscape, it seems impossible to credibly deny that privacy is a right
contemplated by the American legal and constitutional system. Even before
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized it, the deep respect for privacy
within our Anglo common law tradition manifested in the twentieth century
development of common law tort actions for offenses against privacy.
Sensing that contemporary pressures required law to recognize a new tort
action in response to violations of privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published their seminal Right to Privacy.208 They argued that there
existed within the common law tradition a right to privacy the breach of
which was compensable. At the root of this right, in their estimation, was “the
right to be let alone.”209 Their argument proved timely and convincing.
204.
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Prosser, writing in the mid-twentieth century, documented the development
of four different common law privacy torts that emerged in response to
Warren and Brandeis’ argument.210
Five years after Prosser’s writing, the Supreme Court famously declared
the right to privacy to be within the penumbras and emanations of those
rights specifically protected in the Constitution.211 Katz drew upon the
developing body of law recognizing a right to privacy to explicitly link privacy
and Fourth Amendment protections rather than leaving Fourth Amendment
protections hanging solely on property interests.212 While the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy standard is susceptible to serious criticism because of
the difficulties inherent in applying the test, it seems disingenuous to propose
that no right to privacy exists and that it does not have any relationship to
Fourth Amendment interests.
Since the Fourth Amendment is concerned with privacy and not just
property, it was appropriate for the majority to take the track it did. The
modern world has changed what for centuries were normal information
storage practices. At the time of the founding, protecting property with the
Fourth Amendment also protected privacy. However, that is no longer the
case. For the Fourth Amendment to be meaningful at all, it must be
understood to protect the sorts of information it was always intended to
protect—and not just the old means of storing that information (e.g. the four
walls of a home or physical papers). Now that participation in society requires
use of technology and that, in using technology, huge amounts of data are
constantly disclosed to third parties, existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence could not be allowed to stand unmodified. It is a simple
extension of the principle from Kyllo and Heller noted above that
constitutional protections must progress with technology to protect the
modern equivalents of the original object of protection.
In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, he objected that the situation in Carpenter is
no different than the situations in Miller and Smith.213 In fact, he argued that
CSLI is actually less sensitive than banking and phone records.214 If this
criticism were true, the above argument regarding the need to extend Fourth
Amendment protections would be moot. He posited that since “[a] person’s
movements are not particularly private” because, “[a]s the Court recognized
in Knotts, when the defendant . . . ‘traveled over the public streets he
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voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was
traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever
stops he made, and the fact of his final destination.’”215 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the location is now even less private since Americans regularly
disclose their locations on social media.216 He also emphasized that, at
present, CSLI is not particularly granular and could only be used in
Carpenter’s case to place his “location within an area covering between
around a dozen and several hundred city blocks.”217 Contrary to this, Justice
Kennedy noted that phone records and banking records tell with much
greater specificity where one goes and with whom he associates.218 He asserts
that these three types of records are all equal in comprehensiveness,
retrospectivity, ease of collecting, and voluntariness.219 It is not certain that
this is the case for all elements however. In terms of their retrospectivity, ease
of collection, and voluntariness, CSLI, phone records, and bank records are
probably equivalent. However, CSLI is at least potentially more
comprehensive than phone and financial records. While those documents
can present quite comprehensive pictures of certain activities, CSLI data
creates a comprehensive record of one’s physical movements. As previously
discussed, Knotts and Jones recognize that privacy begins to be implicated
when the totality of one’s physical movements are recorded.220 Bank records
could also feasibly be used to create a rather complete picture of one’s
physical movements—assuming one spends money via check, debit card, or
credit card regularly as he moves about. However, while “it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining
a bank account,” it is not necessary to spend money in such a manner as to
create a record of one’s physical movements.221 This is different from cell
phones, which are a necessary part of modern life and cannot be reasonably
used in a manner that does not produce CSLI.
This again raises the issue of whether bank and phone records are any
more voluntarily created than CSLI. Insofar as one voluntarily chooses to
create any of these types of records by using the various services and
products, the answer is no. However, in that neither phone records nor bank
records need create a comprehensive picture of one’s physical movements,
and cell phones cannot be used in a manner that does not create such a
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picture, the disclosure of CSLI data is far less voluntary than the disclosure of
bank and phone records.
So, not only ought the Fourth Amendment protections be adapted and
extended to protect the original object of the Fourth Amendment, it is simply
not tenable to maintain that CSLI data presents no new strains on existing
jurisprudence requiring modification. The majority was right to remain
focused on the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment and perceive
the threats created by the digital revolution. However, the dissenters on the
whole do have a point. First, the Katz test is deeply flawed, and any derivative
rule therefrom can be expected to share in its unwieldiness. Second,
Carpenter has upset existing law and will require an incredible amount of
development and clarification. Having extended Fourth Amendment
protections to the property of another for the first time, but refusing to
articulate a general rule beyond CSLI, chaos can be expected as the circuit
courts seek ways to apply this allegedly limited precedent to the cases that will
inevitably follow. These problems are why Justice Gorsuch’s dissent cannot
be ignored and should be the focus of much study moving forward.
Justice Gorsuch was the only dissenting Justice who seemed to appreciate
the object of the majority even though he could not bring himself to join it.
He stated that he could not “fault the Court today for its implicit but
unmistakable conclusion that the rationale of Smith and Miller is wrong.”222
Noting that the Sixth Circuit had been bound by precedent to apply the thirdparty doctrine, he affirmed that “this Court can and should” reject it.223
Justice Gorsuch thus manifested himself as the only dissenter sensitive to the
majority’s driving purpose of protecting privacy interests within the original
object of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Gorsuch did not join with the majority, however, because rather
than leaving “Smith and Miller on life support and supplement[ing] them
with a new and multilayered inquiry,” Justice Gorsuch wanted a return to
pre-Katz jurisprudence.224 As previously explored, Justice Gorsuch saw great
opportunity for satisfactorily protecting Fourth Amendment privacy
interests in data via property law. This emphasis upon property law as a
means forward has the distinct advantage of allowing for fully protecting the
privacy that is the entire point of the Fourth Amendment while staying
clearly within the original letter of the Constitution. Simply extending Fourth
Amendment interests to the property of others should probably be done if
absolutely necessary in this new digital world to accomplish the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, but accomplishing the same purpose without such
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innovation is preferable. The fact that the Katz Court may have discovered
and recognized situations where, in order to accomplish Fourth Amendment
purposes, one need not have a corresponding property interest, does not
mean that solving all subsequent hard problems will require some similar
innovation.
Statutorily created property interests in data probably present the best
path forward. As is regularly stressed in criticism of Katz’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, judges are poorly situated to make policy decisions
about such issues. Legislatures are best situated to make decisions about what
should and should not be private and could grant property interests in usergenerated data sufficient to create Fourth Amendment interests in that data.
As Justice Gorsuch notes, positive law cannot be permitted to undercut a
person’s Fourth Amendment right.225 He illustrates the point saying,
“[l]egislatures cannot pass laws declaring your house or papers to be your
property except to the extent the police wish to search them without cause.”226
However, while the Constitution provides a floor beneath which one’s Fourth
Amendment rights cannot fall, it is perfectly possible to create new property
interests that extend Fourth Amendment protections.
Justice Gorsuch appropriately sought to maintain the object of the Fourth
Amendment and perceived the deficiencies of prior precedent to function in
the digital age. However, he did not want to support a weak and flawed
approach to solving the problem. His property suggestion offers the
advantage of creating bright line, constitutionally orthodox tests for
protecting the privacy of Americans in the digital age.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Carpenter decision was a first step by the Supreme Court to address
the incredible strains placed upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by the
digital revolution. While the majority rightfully prioritized the spirit over the
letter of the Fourth Amendment and crafted a decision to maintain privacy,
its decision was strained and is still wed to the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy test with all its faults. Indubitably, many more similar cases will
begin to flood the Courts in the immediate future. It remains to be seen if the
Court will keep stretching and improvising solutions within the Katz
paradigm and in line with the recent Carpenter decision, or if the avenues
Justice Gorsuch proposed for simpler, more robust, and sounder solutions to
these problems will be substituted.
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